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Abstract 
 
Real-world network systems, for example, power grids, are critical to modern economies. Due to the increasing 
system scale and complex dependencies inside of these networks, system failures can widely spread and cause 
severe damage. We have experienced massive cascading failures in power grids, such as major U.S. western grid 
failures in 1996 and the great Northeast blackout of 2003. Therefore, analyzing cascading failures and defense 
strategies, in response to system catastrophic breakdown, is crucial. Although many efforts have been performed to 
prevent failure propagation throughout systems, optimal system restoration considering system dependency against 
cascading failures is rarely studied. In this paper, we present a framework to optimize restoration strategies to 
improve system resiliency regarding cascading failures. The effects of restoration strategies are evaluated by system 
resilience loss during the cascading process. Furthermore, how system dependency influences the effects of the 
system restoration actions against cascading failures are investigated. By performing a case study on the western 
U.S. transmission grid, we demonstrate that our framework of system restoration optimization can enhance system 
resiliency by reducing the intensity and extent of cascading failures. Our proposed framework provides insights 
regarding optimal system restoration from cascading failures to enhance resiliency of real-life network systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Large-scale network systems, such as electricity power systems, communication networks and traffic networks, are 
becoming increasingly prevalent and interconnected [1, 2]. These network systems are playing significant roles in 
people’s daily life and industrial development. As a result, ensuring that these systems work effectively and reliably 
is of great concern [3, 4]. Although many efforts have been made to prevent damage of these interdependent systems, 
the previous decades have witnessed world-wide various high-impact failures on different network systems 
following disruptive events, especially in power grids [5-7]. For example, the extensive power outages caused by 
Superstorm Sandy in October 2012 affected more than 8.2 million people across 21 states in the U.S. East Coast in 
terms of economic and social destruction [8]. Consequently, developing effective system restoration strategies to 
enhance power grid resiliency and avoid further failure propagation becomes an important and exciting research 
topic [9-11]. 
Sun et al. [12] developed a new reliability model for networks with fractal growth and no-loop (NF-NL). The model 
is based on the fractal unit of a system, which has a bigger scale than any individual system node or edge, and a 
much smaller scale than the whole network. Zhou et al. [13] proposed a simulated based method for optimizing 
battery size added to photovoltaic (PV) array systems to make power system grid-outage resilient and economically 
viable. Previous system interruptions have already shown the remarkable influence of multiple system dependencies 
on system robustness and dynamic failure behaviors [14, 15]. However, current research on system resiliency 
enhancement rarely if ever takes into account the relationship between multiple system dependencies and different 
restoration strategies regarding cascading failures. 
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In this paper, two different restoration strategies are applied to western states U.S. power transmission grid, which is 
subject to the mixed cascading failures. The impacts of two system dependence characteristics, i.e., the distribution 
that dependence cluster sizes follow and dependency strength, combined with restoration strength, on system 
resiliency and restoration effects are investigated. Then, optimal restoration strategies can be selected based on the 
obtained results. 
2. Restoration strategies 
In this paper, system dependence clusters and system dependency strength are used to describe system dependency. 
System dependence cluster is defined as a collection of system components/nodes which have dependency relations 
between each other, for instance, functional dependency [16]. The illustration of single network system that contains 
dependence clusters of components/nodes is shown in Fig. 1. Dependence cluster collapsing threshold (CCT) 
denotes the dependency strength. It means that a dependence cluster of network nodes instantly collapses, i.e., all 
nodes belonging to this dependence cluster fail once the proportion of failed nodes of this cluster exceeds CCT [17]. 
Therefore, larger CCT indicates weaker dependency relationship among network nodes. It means that the node 
failure in a dependence cluster has less impact on other functioning nodes belonging to the same dependence cluster. 
 
Fig. 1. Network system with dependence clusters of nodes 
A cascading failure model, which was designed for single networks subject to mixed cascading failures including 
dependence-caused failures and load dynamics-caused failures [16], is used to describe cascading failure process. 
Restoration strategies are applied to network systems after cascading failures occur. In this paper, the main 
procedures for network system restoration are implemented and evaluated on the basis of the optimal restoration 
model [18]. 
Two restoration strategies are applied in this paper, same repair probability strategy (SRP) and High-degree first 
repair strategy (HDFR). SRP restoration strategy means the failed network nodes, where repair activity has not yet 
started, are randomly selected to be repaired when maintenance resources are available to do so. The proportion of 
failed nodes which are selected to start maintenance when resources are available is decided by Rp. It is a parameter 
that indicates the restoration strength and the capability of assigned or available maintenance resources. Larger Rp 
means stronger restoration strength. SRP restoration strategy is considered as a baseline to be compared with other 
restoration strategies. HDFR restoration strategy means that the failed nodes of which repairing has not yet started 
are repaired in a descending order of node degree, i.e., network nodes with more node degrees are repaired with 
higher priority. 
The metrics adopted to evaluate restoration effects and system resiliency are StpLCC, StpPerLd and SLF. StpLCC is 
the size of the largest connected component (LCC) of the network system when the system is recovered to the 
predetermined level. LCC is the largest group of network nodes which are fully connected with each other. Larger 
StpLCC indicates better network connectivity. StpPerLd is the percentage of total network load when the network is 
recovered to the predetermined level to the initial amount of network load. This metric reflects the recovery of 
network transmission capability, that is, larger StpPerLd indicates better transmission capability. SLF represents 
total network load fluctuations including cascading failures and restoration process until network performance is 
restored to the acceptable level. It is calculated by Eq. (1), 
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where Lj(t = i) denotes the load on node j at t = i, and Lj(t = i) = 0 if node j is failed at t = i. After the failure of a 
node the load is instantaneously reorganized on the rest of the network system. TL(t = i) means total network load at 
t = i. TL(t = 0) is total network load at initial time, t = 0, before any failures occur. As a result, SLF measures system 
resilience loss in terms of network load when system performance is recovered to a predetermined level at time T, 
which is a type of system performance taking into account system load demand and supply capability. Larger SLF, 
i.e., larger system resilience loss, indicates lower system resiliency. 
3. Simulation analysis of the western U.S. transmission grid 
In this paper, we perform simulation of cascading failures and restoration actions to an infrastructural system, the 
western U.S. power transmission grid [19], which has already been used by many researchers [20]. This realistic 
power system has a topology with 4,941 nodes and 6,594 edges. Each node represents a power plant, a transformer 
or a consumer. Two nodes are connected by undirected edges, on which the electric current can flow in both 
directions, if they are physically connected by cables. The average edges of each node (node degree) in this network 
system are 2.67 and most nodes have comparable degrees. The capacity of each network node in the western U.S. 
power transmission grid is assigned according to the node capacity-load model [21]. In this paper, the two model 
parameters for node capacity allocation, the tolerance parameter of networks, α, is equal to 1.1, and the nonlinear 
coefficient, β, is equal to 0.5. 
In this section, we analyzed the impacts of restoration strength, Rp, and two dependence characteristics, i.e., CCT 
and the distribution of sizes of dependence clusters, on the effects of two restoration strategies and system resiliency 
regarding mixed cascading failures.  
Two different assumptions of dependence cluster distributions are considered in this paper, respectively, (1) each 
dependence cluster in the system has the same number of dependent nodes, which is D-size; (2) sizes of dependence 
clusters follow an adjusted Poisson distribution (to prevent clusters with zero components/nodes), where the mean 
size is D-size [22]. 
For the following results, D-size = {3, 5, 7}, CCT = {0.5, 0.9}, Rp = {0.7, 0.8}. The required repair time of each 
failed component/network node, Tr = 1, is assumed to be constant. Random failures of network nodes, that is, initial 
random failed network nodes, are triggers for cascading failures. Simulation results are averaged over different 
number of initial failed system nodes, and the initial failed numbers of system nodes that we considered are {9, 15, 
21, 27, 33, 39, 45, 51, 57, 63}. Results are presented in the following Tables 1 and 2. Note that each value in the 
tables corresponds to the average over 5 simulation realizations. It is assumed that the entire simulation process, 
including cascading failures and restoration, stops when network efficiency is recovered to be more than 90% of the 
initial system state. 
1) Results under SRP strategy 
SRP restoration strategy is applied first. The corresponding results of three metrics are shown in Table 1a to c. 
 
Table 1a: Average SRP results with dependence cluster size following different distributions - StpLCC 
StpLCC 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp=0.7 Rp=0.8 Average 
Rp=0.7 Rp=0.8 Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 4761 4809 4755 4770 4774 4713 4745 4867 4824 4787 
D-size=5 4816 4685 4736 4822 4765 4695 4795 4806 4762 4765 
D-size=7 4622 4797 4826 4797 4761 4692 4726 4844 4720 4746 
Average 4733 4764 4772 4796 4766 4700 4755 4839 4769 4766 
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Table 1b: Average SRP results with dependence cluster size following different distributions - StpPerLd 
StpPerLd 
(%) 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 97.12 98 97.06 96.62 97.2 96.02 96.34 98.58 97.4 97.1 
D-size=5 97.44 95.92 96.22 97.62 96.8 95.8 97.64 96.9 95.78 96.5 
D-size=7 95 97.32 97.36 97.42 96.8 95.1 95.4 98.4 96.5 96.4 
Average 96.5 97.1 96.9 97.2 96.9 95.6 96.5 98.0 96.6 96.7 
 
Table 1c: Average SRP results with dependence cluster size following different distributions - SLF 
SLF (×103) 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 12502 8946 13398 14862 12427.0 17434 16200 6097 11285 12754.0 
D-size=5 11264 17952 16734 10549 14124.8 18434 10532 13606 18471 15260.8 
D-size=7 22042 11872 11586 11578 14269.5 21790 20012 6938 15294 16008.5 
Average 15269.3 12923.3 13906.0 12329.7 13607.1 19219.3 15581.3 8880.3 15016.7 14674.4 
 
As indicated in Table 1, dependence cluster size following different distributions does not noticeably impact the 
effect of SRP restoration strategy in terms of StpLCC and StpPerLd except resilience loss, i.e., SLF. In comparison 
to resilience loss accompanied with system having dependence clusters with same fixed size, greater resilience loss 
is incurred when dependence cluster sizes follow an adjusted Poisson distribution. 
 
In addition, larger Rp or smaller D-size lead to larger StpLCC, StpPerLd and smaller SLF, which indicates better 
system connectivity, transmission capability and less resilience loss denoting better restoration effects. Whereas the 
impacts of CCT on restoration effects are distinct when dependence cluster sizes follow different assumptions. 
Larger CCT contributes to better restoration effects when all dependence clusters have same fixed size, while CCT 
impact is influenced by Rp when cluster sizes follow an adjusted Poisson distribution. 
 
2) Results under HDFR restoration strategy 
We applied HDFR restoration strategy, and the results of three metrics in this case are shown in Table 2a to c. 
 
Table 2a: Average HDFR results under dependence cluster size following different distributions - StpLCC 
StpLCC 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 4920 4910 4932 4924 4922 4904 4910 4917 4927 4915 
D-size=5 4911 4914 4927 4932 4921 4912 4914 4928 4931 4921 
D-size=7 4913 4921 4931 4929 4924 4906 4916 4929 4924 4919 
Average 4915 4915 4930 4928 4922 4907 4913 4925 4927 4918 
 
Table 2b: Average HDFR results under dependence cluster size following different distributions - StpPerLd 
StpPerLd 
(%) 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp=0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 99.46 99.24 99.78 99.72 99.6 98.74 99.32 99.06 99.76 99.2 
D-size=5 99.2 99.32 99.68 99.82 99.5 99.38 99.44 99.66 99.84 99.6 
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D-size=7 99.32 99.48 99.72 99.76 99.6 98.76 99.34 99.74 99.78 99.4 
Average 99.3 99.3 99.7 99.8 99.5 99.0 99.4 99.5 99.8 99.4 
 
Table 2c: Average HDFR results under dependence cluster size following different distributions - StpLCC 
SLF (×103) 
All clusters with same fixed size Cluster sizes follow adjusted Poisson distribution 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 
Average 
Rp =0.7 Rp =0.8 
Average 
CCT 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 
D-size=3 2393 3331 1424 1908 2264.0 5625 3332 4528 1714 3799.8 
D-size=5 3637 3253 1663 1399 2488.0 2965 2738 2136 1431 2317.5 
D-size=7 2934 2617 1595 1651 2199.3 5606 2931 1695 1860 3023.0 
Average 2988.0 3067.0 1560.7 1652.7 2317.1 4732.0 3000.3 2786.3 1668.3 3046.8 
 
Similar to what was found from Table 1, the distribution that dependence cluster sizes follow does not markedly 
influence the restoration effect of HDFR strategy regarding StpPerLd and StpLCC. However, the distribution of 
cluster sizes affects resilience loss, i.e., SLF. Less resilience loss is achieved for a system that has dependence 
clusters with the same fixed size compared with that of the system with dependence cluster sizes following an 
adjusted Poisson distribution. 
 
It can be seen from Table 2 that larger Rp leads to better restoration effect in terms of three metrics without respect 
to D-size or CCT is, whereas D-size does not show a monotonic impact on restoration effect. Larger CCT contributes 
to better restoration effect when dependence cluster sizes follow an adjusted Poisson distribution. While CCT has an 
opposite impact on restoration effect when dependence clusters have same fixed size, which means larger CCT 
impairs restoration effect.  
 
Above all, it can be observed that HDFR restoration strategy shows better effects regarding resiliency recovery than 
that of SRP restoration strategy on western states U.S. power transmission grid against mixed cascading failures. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, western states U.S. power transmission grid is used as the network system to conduct analysis of 
cascading failures and restoration process. According to the results from the application of two restoration strategies, 
restoration strength, which is presented by Rp, exerts a remarkable impact on restoration effect with respect to 
network system connectivity, transmission capability and system resilience loss. Larger Rp leads to better restoration 
effect, while the impacts of network dependence characteristics on restoration effects are distinct when applying 
different restoration strategies. It demonstrates that it is critical to taken into account the specific dependence 
characteristics with the network systems to find optimal restoration strategy. Our results can be useful for 
understanding and selecting optimal restoration strategy for different network systems. In the future research, other 
restoration strategies can be applied to different real-world network systems considering the impacts of multiple 
network dependencies. Since available budgets for restoration investment are limited in real cases, budget 
constraints can be incorporated regarding restoration optimization from an economic aspect in the next extension of 
current research. 
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